Damning Critique of the U S Military

A particularly insightful article over at Tom Rick’s blog site on the the failure of American leadership in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  It damns the idea we have the war one year at a time and takes to tasks the military personnel system (here I will lay the blame at the feet of personalists in the Army G1 and at Human Resources Command)  for the failure of AFPAK hands and military advise and assist mission teams.

Über keydet1976

Retired as a Colonel in the United States Army after 33 years of service. Graduate of the VMI, MA in History at JMU, completed course work for Ph.D in History University of Tennessee.
Dieser Beitrag wurde unter Afghanistan, Iran, The King of Battle veröffentlicht. Setze ein Lesezeichen auf den Permalink.

Eine Antwort zu Damning Critique of the U S Military

  1. slater schreibt:

    Our problem with how we fought Vietnam and subsequently Iraq II and Afghanistan is that these weren’t wars of Survival where Soldiers remained deployed for the entirety of the war or their enlistment. So that means institutional knowledge. The problem with the program is that it is a program, not a Functional Area. Also, our SF is supposed to train units, that why they exist, to start from the ground up. SFATs, for the most part were not made up of augmentees (whole battalion staffs), the ones made up of individual augmentee were hard to compete for…but their results in promotion rates were similar to AFPAK Hands…as in OSB and QMP galore.


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